University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 30
Number 2 Spring 2000

Article 12

2000

Recent Developments: Koch v. Strathmeyer:
Implied Easement over Subdivided Lots Extended
from Public Road to the Water's Edge, Entitling
Interior Lot Owners to Waterfront Access
David Schmitz

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Schmitz, David (2000) "Recent Developments: Koch v. Strathmeyer: Implied Easement over Subdivided Lots Extended from Public
Road to the Water's Edge, Entitling Interior Lot Owners to Waterfront Access," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 30 : No. 2 ,
Article 12.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol30/iss2/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Recent Developments

Koch v. Strathmeyer
Implied Easement Over Subdivided Lots Extended from Public Road to the
Water's Edge, Entitling Interior Lot Owners to Waterfront Access
By David Schmitz

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland recently held that
access to a public navigable creek was
within the scope of an easement
granted under the general rule of
implied easements over roads
bordering conveyed property. Koch
v. Strathmeyer, 357 Md. 193, 742
A.2d 946 (1999). The court
reasoned that the general rule, limiting
the reach of the easement to the next
street or public way, was naturally
extended to include navigable
waterways when such was the original
intent of the grantor of the land.
In 1940, George Hazard
("Hazard") began selling lots from his
seven parcel waterfront subdivision.
Through the subdivision, and
bordering each lot, was a 16-foot
gravel road that connected the county
road to the shoreline of Lerch's
Creek Through subsequent years,
the original seven parcel subdivision
was consolidated into four lots; two
waterfront lots, owned by Mr. and
Mrs. Koch and Mr. Brewer, and two
interior lots, owned by Mr. and Mrs.
Strathmeyer and Mr. and Mrs.
Hantske. The four lots were still
partially bisected by the gravel road;
however, the gravel road no longer
extended to the water's edge but
rather stopped some 85 feet
therefrom. The two waterfront
parcels covered the original gravel
road with grass and placed

obstructions within its path. This had
the deleterious effect of denying the
two interior lot owners the full use and
enjoyment of access to the waterfront.
In a two-count complaint, the
two interior lot owners petitioned the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County, asking it to take various
actions. First, Plaintiffs asked the
court to recognize an implied easement
over the path ofthe original gravel road
to the waters edge; second, to enjoin
the waterfront lots from interfering with
their right-of-way to the waterfront;
and third, to have the waterfront lots
pay damages resulting from the denied
access to the waterfront. The circuit
court ruled in favor of the interior lot
owners, however, it denied their
damages claim. In a timely appeal,
the court of special appeals affirmed
the lower court's decision The court
ofappeals granted a petition for a writ
of certiorari in order to determine
"whether the creation of a 16 foot
road bounding ... lots in a waterfront
subdivision ... is sufficient evidence
of the clear manifestation of the
common grantor's intent necessary to
establish that the present interior lot
owners enjoy an implied easement to
the water over that 16 foot road."
In its review of the case, the
court of appeals first turned to the
language found in the original
conveyance of the land by George
Hazard. In all seven of the original

deeds, the court found that the gravel
road was used as a metes and bounds
description to separate the lots and
that each lot abutted the gravel road.
Jd at 198, 742 A.2d at 948. "The
existence, location, and size of the
road is undisputed." ld at 198,742
A.2d at 949. The court held that
under well-settled Maryland law,
"when Hazard conveyed the
property by a metes and bounds
description naming the 16 foot road
as a boundary, each lot owner
acquired fee simple title up to the
center of the road contiguous to his
or her property." Jd at 198, 742
A.2d at 949 (citing Md. Ann. Code
art. 21 § 114 (1939). The court
noted that although all the parties
stipulated to the existence of the
easement, the issue in question
centered on whether or not the
easement extended to the waterfront.
Jd at 199, 742 A.2d at 949.
After recognizing that an
easement did exist in favor of all the
lot owners, the court next turned to
the scope of the easement. The court
of appeals found that case law
defined the general rule of implied
easements over roads bordering
conveyed property as extending "until
it reaches some other street or public
way." Jd. (citing Hawley v.
Baltimore, 33 Md. 270 (1870».
When a common grantor conveyed
land bordering streets, there existed
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a rebuttable presumption that the
common grantor intended "to offer to
dedicate the streets [for] public use,"
or " ... grant the purchasers an implied
right-of-way over the streets
contiguous to their lots to the next
closest street or public way." ld at
200, 742 A.2d at 949 (citing
Hackerman v. Baltimore 212 Md.
624, 625, 130 A.2d 735, 736
(1957)). The court, by analogy,
reasoned that if the waterfront were
considered a street or public way,
under Hawley, the easement would
extend to both the waterfront and the
opposite county road. ld at 200, 742
A.2d at 950.
The court ofappeals rejected the
waterfront lot owners' assertion that
the existence of the navigable
waterway cut off the interior lots'
implied easement at the border ofthe
waterfront lots. ld at 201, 742 A.2d
at 950. The argument that the closest
street or public way was the county
road was soundly rejected by the
court. Rather the court opined that
this case squarely fit within the general
rule of implied easements over roads
bordering conveyed property. ld
Not only was the waterfront owned
and maintained by the state, but it was
a "public way" as well. ld The court
concluded that the original gravel road
was bounded on one side by a public
county road and on the other side by
a public waterway. ld Therefore,
the interior lot owners enjoyed an
implied easement that extended not
only to the county road, but also to
the water's edge. ld
In the last portion of its opinion,
the court distinguished the cases
proffered by the interior lot owners.
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The court rejected the notion that
under the facts of the instant case, the
waterway was a special exception to
the general rule. ld Rather, the court
reasoned that the general rule of
implied easements was clearly
applicable to a waterway. ld When
the lots were conveyed, the court
concluded the original grantor
bisected the development so that
each lot was contiguous to the gravel
road. ld at 203, 742 A.2d at 951.
It was only logical for the easement
to extend to the waterfront so that
each lot could have full use and
enjoyment of the waterfront. ld
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland rejected the notion that a
public way does not include a public
waterway. This case clarifies and
extends the common law notion of
"public way" regarding implied
easements to include waterways.
Although this common law clarification
might seem somewhat nugatory, in a
state where most ofits inhabitants live
near the coast, this case is an important
clarification for waterfront property
law.
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